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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003).
LAW: ERISA does not require plan administrators to accord
special deference to opinions of treating physicians.
FACTS: Kenneth Nord was formerly employed by a Black &
Decker subsidiary as a material planner. His job was classed
"sedentary" and required up to six hours of sitting and two hours
of standing or walking per day. The Black & Decker Disability
Plan ("Black & Decker") is an ERISA-governed employee
welfare benefit plan that provides benefits for eligible employees
with a disability. Disability determinations are to be made based
on suitable medical evidence and a review of the participant's
employment history that the administrator "deems satisfactory in
its sole and absolute discretion." Nord submitted a claim for
disability benefits which was denied. At the review stage, Nord
submitted letters and supporting documentation from his
physician, Dr. Hartman, and a treating orthopedist to whom
Hartman had referred Nord. These treating physicians stated that
Nord suffered from a degenerative disc disease and chronic pain
that rendered him unable to work. Black & Decker referred Nord
to a neurologist for an independent examination. The neurologist
concluded that, aided by medication, Nord could perform
sedentary work. The administrator recommended that Nord's
claim be denied, which Black & Decker accepted. Nord filed this
action under ERISA seeking to overturn the decision, claiming
that ERISA plan administrators must follow a "treating physician
rule." Under said rule, if a plan administrator rejects the opinions
of a treating physician, it must come forward with specific
reasons for its decision. The Ninth Circuit found that the plan
administrator had not provided adequate justification for rejecting
the opinions of the treating physicians.
ANALYSIS: The treating physician rule imposed by the Ninth
Circuit was originally developed by Courts of Appeals as a
means to control disability determinations by administrative law
judges under the Social Security Act. Nothing in the ERISA
regulations, however, suggests the plan administrators must
accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians,
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nor does it impose a heightened burden of explanation on
administrators when rejecting a treating physician's opinion. The
Secretary of Labor has not adopted such a rule and the amicus
brief reflecting the Secretary of Labor's position opposes
adoption of such a rule for disability determinations under
ERISA. Whether such a rule should apply is a question for the
Legislature, not the courts. Plan administrators may not
arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant's reliable evidence,
including the opinions of a treating physician. But, courts have
no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord
special weight to the opinions of a claimant's physician, nor may
courts impose on administrators a discrete burden of explanation
when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating
physician's evaluation.
HOLDING: Because the treating physician rule lacked
endorsement by the Department of Labor, the Court of Appeals
erred in imposing such a rule. The judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.
IMPACT: The Supreme Court limits the discretion that lower
courts have in fashioning a remedy under ERISA regulations.
Since the treating physician rule is not adopted in the regulations,
it should not be employed unless endorsed by the Secretary of
Labor and then it would be reviewed by the courts. Without such
an endorsement, this rule must be added by the Legislature if it is
to be used.
City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003).
LAW: A thirty day delay in holding a hearing for a parking
violation does not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.
FACTS: An officer of the city of Los Angeles Department of
Transportation ordered Edwin David's automobile towed from a
spot where parking was forbidden. After paying $134.50, David
recovered his car. David, believing that the trees obstructed his
view of the "no parking" sign, requested a hearing to recover the
money. Twenty-seven days after the vehicle was towed, the city
held the hearing and denied David's claim. David brought this
lawsuit in federal district court arguing that the city, in failing to
provide a sufficiently prompt hearing, had violated his federal
right to due process of law. The District Court granted summary
judgment for the city; but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the Constitution required the city to
provide an earlier payment-recovery hearing, perhaps within
forty-eight hours, and at least within five days.
ANALYSIS: The Court considered three factors in determining
whether the delay violated due process of law. The first factor is
the private interest that will be affected by the official action. In
the instant case, the private interest is monetary - his interest in
maintaining the use of money between the time of paying the
impoundment and towing fees and the time of hearing. Since any
loss in the time value of money can be compensated by an
interest payment, the private interest here does not meet the
requisite harm. Second, the Court looks at the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
safeguards. A thirty day delay in presenting evidence is unlikely
to spawn significant factual errors. Most administrative and
judicial proceedings take place after considerably more time has
elapsed. Finally, the Court considered the government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail. The nature of the city's interest in delay is one of
administrative necessity, since it conducts more than one
thousand vehicle impound hearings annually. Because it takes
time to organize the hearings and resources are limited, imposing
a 48-hour (or five day) time limit would prove overly
burdensome.
HOLDING: The thirty day delay in holding a hearing here
reflects no more than a routine delay substantially required by
administrative needs. The Ninth Circuit's judgment is reversed.
IMPACT: The Supreme Court recognizes the limitations of
state resources and gives local administrative bodies leeway in
conducting its hearings.
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FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications. Inc., 537 U.S. 293
(2003).
LAW: Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits an agency
from canceling licenses held by a bankruptcy debtor upon the
debtor's failure to make timely payments to that agency for
purchase of the licenses.
FACTS: In an FCC auction, NextWave Personal
Communications, Inc. ("NextWave") bid on and was awarded
personal communications services licenses, payable in
installments. NextWave made a down payment on the purchase
prices, signed promissory notes for the balance, and executed
agreements giving the FCC a first lien on, and security interest in
the licenses. The agreements recited that they were conditioned
on the full and timely payment of all moneys due the FCC, and
that failure to comply with this condition would result in their
automatic cancellation. NextWave eventually filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection and suspended payments to all
creditors, including the FCC, pending confirmation of its
reorganization plan. The FCC objected to the plan, asserting
NextWave's licenses had been canceled automatically when the
company missed its first payment deadline, and announced that
NextWave's licenses were available for auction. The District of
Columbia Circuit Court held that the cancellation violated 11
U.S.C. § 525(a).
ANALYSIS: The Court rejected the FCC's argument that the
FCC did not revoke NextWave's licenses "solely because" of
nonpayment under § 525. The fact that the FCC had a valid
regulatory motive for its action is irrelevant. The failure to pay a
dischargeable debt must alone be the proximate cause of the
cancellation. Further, the Court rejects the contention that
regulatory conditions like full and timely payment are not
properly classified as "debts." The plain meaning of a "right to
payment" is nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation.
Therefore, any debt (such as the one to the FCC) that arose before
the confirmation of a reorganization plan is dischargeable.
Finally, there is no conflict with the Communications Act by
obstructing the functioning of that Act's auction provisions.
Nothing in those provisions demands that cancellation be the
sanction for failure to make agreed-upon periodic payments or
even requires the FCC to permit payment to be made over time.
HOLDING: Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits
the FCC from revoking licenses held by a bankruptcy debtor
upon the debtor's failure to make timely payments to the FCC for
purchase of the licenses. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
IMPACT: The Supreme Court applies the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code to the contract between the FCC and NextWave
even if it was beyond the bankruptcy court's jurisdictional
authority to alter or modify regulatory obligations. This decision
affords great protection to debtors who file for Chapter 11
bankruptcy.
Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003).
LAW: The Fair Housing Act provides for vicarious liability
against the corporation, but not its owner or officer, for the torts
of its employees or agents.
FACTS: The Holleys, an interracial married couple, tried to buy
a house listed for sale by Triad, a real estate corporation. A Triad
salesman is alleged to have prevented the Holleys from buying
the house for racially discriminatory reasons. After filing suit in
federal court against the salesman and Triad, the Holleys filed a
separate suit against Meyer, Triad's president, sole shareholder,
and licensed "officer/broker," claiming that he was vicariously
liable in one or more of these capacities for the salesman's
unlawful actions. The District Court consolidated the lawsuits
and dismissed the claims against Meyer because it believed that
the Fair Housing Act did not impose personal vicarious liability
upon a corporate officer. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that the Act imposes strict liability principles beyond those
traditionally associated with agent/principal or
employee/employer relationships.
ANALYSIS: The court determined that, although the Act says
nothing about vicarious liability, it is well established that it
provides for such liability. Traditional vicarious liability rules
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ordinarily make principals or employers vicariously liable for the
acts of their agents or employees in the scope of their
employment. Such silence by the statute on the issue cannot
show that Congress intended to apply an unusual modification of
those rules. Further, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD"), the agency charged with the Act's
implementation and administration, has specified that ordinary
vicarious liability rules apply in this area, and the Court should
defer to an administering agency's reasonable statutory
interpretation.
HOLDING: The Act imposes liability without fault upon the
employer in accordance with traditional agency principles. The
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is vacated and
remanded for further proceedings.
IMPACT: When a statute is silent on an issue, the administering
agency's interpretation will be given great weight when being
reviewed by the courts. This decision affords administering
agencies great power in interpreting statutes.
Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior 538 U.S. 803
(2003).
LAW: This decision did not determine any controversy over the
meaning of the law, but rather determined that the controversy
was not yet ripe for judicial resolution.
FACTS: After Congress enacted the National Parks Omnibus
Management Act of 1998 ("1998 Act"), establishing a
comprehensive concession management program for national
parks, the National Park Service ("NPS") issued an implementing
regulation, 36 CFR § 51.3 (2002) ("§ 51.3"), that purported to
render the Contract Dispute Act ("CDA"), a statute that
established rules governing disputes arising out of certain
government contracts, inapplicable to concession contracts. The
National Park Hospitality Association, a concessioners'
association, challenged the validity to this regulation on its face.
The District Court upheld the regulation, concluding that the
CDA is ambiguous on whether it applies to concession contracts
and finding NPS' interpretation reasonable under the Chevron
test. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, placing no
reliance on Chevron, but finding the NPS' reading of the CDA
consistent with both the CDA and § 51.3.
ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court looked to whether this
controversy was ripe for judicial review by evaluating (1) the
issues' fitness for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the
parties of withholding court consideration. Since NPS has no
delegated rulemaking authority under the CDA, § 51.3 is not a
legislative regulation with the force of law. Neither is § 51.3 an
interpretative regulation advising the public of the agency's
construction of the statute because the NPS is not empowered to
administer the CDA. The Court determined that § 51.3 is nothing
more than a general policy statement designed to inform the
public of the NPS' views on the CDA's proper application. Thus,
§ 51.3 does not create "adverse effects of a strictly legal kind,"
which are required for a hardship showing. Moreover, § 51.3
does not affect a concessioner's primary conduct, as it leaves the
concessioner free to conduct its business as it sees fit. Should a
dispute arise, there is nothing in the regulation that prevents
concessioners from following the procedures set forth in the
CDA. Mere uncertainty as to the validity of a legal rule does not
constitute hardship for the purposes of the ripeness analysis. As
to whether the issue is fit for review, further factual development
would "significantly advance this court's ability to deal with the
legal issues presented, even though the question is 'purely legal'
and § 51.3 constitutes 'final agency action' under the APA."
HOLDING: Judicial resolution of the question presented should
await a concrete dispute about a particular concession contract.
The decision of the lower courts is vacated and remanded.
IMPACT: If an agency has not been delegated rulemaking
authority or the power to administer a specific statute, any
regulations it sets forth regarding the applicability of another
statute is nothing more than a "general statement of policy" that
can only serve to inform the public of its views on the proper
application of that statute. Such a regulation carries no weight or
persuasive authority when being reviewed by the courts.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT
Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas v. NLRB, 309 F.3d 578
(9th Cir. 2003).
LAW: In order for a board's decision to be upheld, it must
present a reasoned explanation to support its order.
FACTS: The employers and the union had collective bargaining
relationships for more than thirty (30) years. The employers had
separate, but substantially identical, agreements with the union.
The most recent agreements contained a dues-checkoff provision
under which the Employers agreed to deduct union dues directly
from employee paychecks and remit to the union. The Board
determined that the union had a contractual right to such
checkoffs so long as the contracts remained in force. Thus,
"when the contracts terminated, the [employer] was free of its
checkoff obligation to the Union." However, under the
"unilateral change doctrine," as set forth in NLRB v. Katz, 369
U.S. 736 (1962), an employer's obligation to abide by the terms
of a contract survives expiration of the contract before bargaining
for a new agreement or impasse. The Board relied on Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963), that involved a
union contract containing a union security provision and a dues
checkoff provision, unlike the instant case that only had a dues
checkoff provision. The Board cited numerous Board and court
cases citing the holding of Bethlehem Steel for the proposition
that an employer's checkoff obligation does not survive the
contract created the obligation. However, no analysis is made in
the absence of a union security provision. Therefore, the issue is
whether the dues checkoff provision, unaccompanied by a union
security provision, survives the expiration of the contract.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that "[a]lthough a Board rule
may become 'well established' through repetition, it may 'come
to stand for' a legal rule only through reasoned decisionmaking."
The Board failed to offer an explanation, beyond that provided in
Bethlehem Steel, for excluding dues-checkoff from the unilateral
change doctrine in the absence of union security. The court
found that the Board's finding --- that the dues-checkoff
arrangement implemented the union security provision --- created
substantial ambiguity in the rationale underlying Bethlehem
Steel's holding regarding dues-checkoff. The court's reasoning
in Bethlehem Steel was that the right to require union
membership as a condition of employment is dependent upon a
contract which the meets the statutory standards. The checkoff is
merely a means of implementing union security. Here, since the
collective bargaining agreements between the Employers and the
union do not contain union security provisions, the Board's
reasoning would not support the rules that it applies in this case.
HOLDING: The court could not discern the Board's rationale
for its rule and therefore vacated the Board's decision and remand
so that the Board can articulate a reasoned explanation for the
rule it adopted or adopt a different rule and present a reasoned
explanation to support it.
IMPACT: This decision forces the National Labor Relations
Board to present well-reasoned analyses for its decisions. The
Board is not granted wide deference to make decisions without
providing legal support. This decision underscores the
responsibility that Board members have in decisionmaking.
Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn, 307 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2002).
LAW: The district court may impose interim measures without
holding an evidentiary hearing depending on the facts of the case.
FACTS: Idaho Watersheds Project and Committee for Idaho's
High Desert ("Environmental Groups") brought suit in federal
district court alleging a violation of the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA") by the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") in the exercise of its power to issue grazing permits to
cattle ranchers on federal lands in the Owyhee Resource Area
("Owyhee"). The BLM is responsible for managing the Owyhee
and is required to consider the environmental impact of its
actions, such as issuing permits on livestock grazing. In 1981,
the BLM adopted a master plan to guide its management of the
Owyhee. In 1995, major changes were made to the grazing
regulations including a new requirement that all ranchers grazing
cattle in the Owyhee obtain a grazing permit and undergo an
annual reauthorization. As a result of these changes, most
ranchers needed new multi-year permits because they either did
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not hold a permit or their permit had expired. The BLM issued
sixty-eight permits to ranchers and the Environmental Groups
filed suit. The district court found that the BLM violated NEPA
by not preparing required environmental documentation before
issuing the permits. It granted a permanent injunction imposing
interim conditions on grazing and imposing a timetable for the
BLM to issue new permits in compliance with NEPA.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the BLM was the party
that proposed the interim measures and much deference is shown
to factual and technical determinations made by the agency with
substantial expertise. Further, since the measures were only
interim and not permanent, it would be inefficient to require the
district court to conduct an extensive inquiry in order to support
interim measures that are designed to temporarily protect the
environment while the BLM conducts studies in order to make
the very same scientific determinations. While the BLM is
conducting environmental studies, the Ranchers and
Environmental Groups will be given adequate opportunity to give
input as to what measures should be implemented permanently
and then they can challenge the outcome in court if necessary.
HOLDING: Because the interim measures are designed to allow
for a process to take place which will determine permanent
measures, and all parties will have adequate opportunity to
participate in the determination of permanent measures, an
evidentiary hearing is not required on the facts of this case.
IMPACT: This decision gives great discretion to the district
court in fashioning a remedy, specifically interim measures. The
court's remedy is quite practical in that there is no need to
undergo the very same scientific studies twice to determine both
interim and permanent measures. Experts can duel it out when
determining permanent measures, but the court has the discretion
to forego these efforts when issuing a temporary remedy.
ALASKA STATE COURT
Brandon v. State. 73 P.3d 1230 (Alaska 2003).
LAW: Under Alaska law, charges of high-moderate infractions
do not guarantee a three-person panel to preside over the
disciplinary proceeding. Absent some showing of impartiality or
constitutional violation, a single hearing officer may hear the
case.
FACTS: Richard Brandon, an inmate at a correctional facility in
Seward, Alaska, was searched and found to have tobacco in his
pocket, in violation of the Alaska Administrative Code. He was
charged with what amounted to a "high-moderate" infraction, and
the disciplinary hearing was conducted by a single hearing
officer. Brandon called no witnesses and conceded his
possession of the tobacco, but pled not guilty and argued only
that he should have been charged with a lesser infraction. He was
found guilty and sentenced to fifteen days of punitive
segregation. Brandon appealed his conviction to the correctional
facility superintendent on the sole ground that his hearing had
been conducted by a single hearing officer instead of the three-
member committee required by the administrative code in force
at the time of his infraction and hearing. His appeal was rejected
by the superintendent and he then appealed to the superior court
claiming violations of his state and federal constitutional rights.
Again, the conviction was upheld and Brandon has sought final
review by the Alaska Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected Brandon's appeal, reasoning
that a three-member hearing body is required for major
infractions, but not for lesser infractions. The court has never
specifically addressed what process is due in proceedings
involving less than major infractions. Because single hearing
officers are not presumed to be biased in prison disciplinary
proceedings, and because Brandon offered no specific allegations
of bias or explanation of why a high-moderate infraction requires
adjudication by a committee instead of a single hearing officer,
the court held that Brandon has not shown a violation of his
constitutional rights. Further, the fact that the Department of
Corrections failed to follow its own regulations does not amount
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to a due process violation. The proposition that an administrative
agency must follow its own regulation is a proposition of
administrative law, not constitutional law. The Alaska statute
specifically distinguishes between failures to follow regulations
in Department of Corrections disciplinary hearings that result in
constitutional violations and those that do not. Since Brandon
has not demonstrated that his constitutional rights were violated,
the statute does not permit reversal.
HOLDING: Because Brandon did not show any violation of his
constitutional rights or any substantive prejudice arising from the
Department of Correction's alleged failure to follow its own
regulations, the decisions of the Department of Corrections are
affirmed.
IMPACT: The court gives great deference to the Department of
Corrections in determining how it will conduct disciplinary
proceedings. Absent some showing of prejudice or violations of
constitutional rights, it is likely that the Department of
Corrections procedures will be upheld.
CALIFORNIA STATE COURT
Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d
234 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
LAW: The protections of procedural due process require a fair
hearing before an unbiased decision maker in administrative
proceedings. Where counsel acts as an advocate in a given case,
he or she is precluded from advising a decisionmaking body in
the same case.
FACTS: Nightlife Partners, Ltd. owns and operates adult
entertainment establishments in Beverly Hills, California in
accordance with the regulatory permit required by the city's
municipal code. Nightlife filed a petition for a writ of
administrative mandate seeking relief from an order denying its
renewal application for an adult entertainment regulatory permit.
At the hearing where Nightlife was denied the permit, the hearing
officer was assisted by an assistant city attorney who had
23-2
represented the city in its initial denial of Nightlife's permit
renewal application. In the hearing officer's declaration in
opposition to Nightlife's mandamus petition, he denied that he
was biased, but failed to respond to the claim that he was assisted
during the hearing by the city attorney. The trial court refused to
admit the declaration into evidence and granted the petition,
determining that Nightlife's due process rights had been violated.
The trial court ordered the city to grant Nightlife a new hearing.
The California Court of Appeal modified the order to direct that
the new hearing not be conducted by the original hearing officer
nor by any person who had served as the city's advocate in this or
any related case. It otherwise affirmed the trial court's ruling.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that since there was a
combining of the functions of advocacy and adjudication by a
single individual, Nightlife's procedural due process rights were
violated. Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the
court of appeal invoked its power to review evidence not in the
body of the record since the claim on appeal is one of procedural
unfairness. The court examined the possible ex parte contacts
between the hearing officer and the city attorney, which was not
available in the court record. The court determined that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the hearing
officer's declaration and that an inference was created by his
omissions in the declaration that he was assisted by the city
attorney. Since the dual functions were not held by different
sections of a single office, but rather a single individual, such
assistance to the hearing officer is improper. Further, there was
no procedure in place that automatically prevented the hearing
officer's decision from being the final decision, absent some
action and expense on the part of the applicant.
HOLDING: Affirmed as modified. The confounding of
advocacy and adjudicative functions, without procedural
safeguards in place, is violative of applicants' due process rights.
IMPACT: The court narrows the longstanding rule that the
combination of investigative and adjudicative functions, standing
alone, does not create a due process violation in the absence of
some showing of bias. The court stated that when prosecutory
and adjudicative functions are so closely combined, it is a
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violation of due process, even though previous courts had
somewhat relaxed the procedural due process standard in such
cases. Without procedural safeguards in place, an individual
acting as an advocate and advisor to the hearing officer will
render the proceeding unconstitutional.
S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Peevey, 74 P.3d 795 (Cal. 2003).
LAW: A stipulated judgment between two parties that would
only maintain current utility rates did not violate section 454 of
the California Public Utilities Code, even though no public
hearing was held and there was no issuance of findings.
FACTS: Electric public utility brought an action for injunctive
and declaratory relief against Commissioners of California Public
Utilities Commission ("PUC"), claiming that PUC's refusal to
increase retail rates as its wholesale power costs rose was
preempted by federal law. The federal district court granted
permissive intervention to a nonprofit utility reform organization,
but denied motions to intervene by wholesale generators of
electricity, trade association for local manufacturing, and
technology companies. The court approved the stipulated
judgment between the parties, which resulted in an appeal by the
nonprofit organization and proposed interveners. Upon appeal,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified to the California
Supreme Court the question of whether the stipulated judgment
violates section 454 of the Public Utilities Code by altering utility
rates without a public hearing and issuance of findings.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned it need not determine the
question of whether a stipulated judgment to alter rates would be
violative of section 454 because the judgment entered into did not
change rates, but rather maintained the approved rates for a
specified period. Section 454 contemplates a formal application
for a "change" in rates or for alteration of some condition of
services so as to create a "new rate," but an application merely to
maintain a rate appears not within the statute's contemplation.
HOLDING: The California Supreme Court held that PUC's
agreement to the settlement did not violate section 454's
23-2
requirement that a rate change or new rate be justified by a
showing and finding.
IMPACT: This decision gives the PUC greater autonomy in
entering into settlement agreements. It limits the application of
section 454 to a change in rates, rather than any action to
maintain the current approved rate.
COLORADO STATE COURT
Venard v. Dep't of Corrections, 72 P.3d 446 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
LAW: When a board member serves as a direct adversary to
complainant's counsel at the same time that she is sitting as a
decision maker in complainant's case, there is an appearance of
impropriety and it is abuse of discretion for the board to allow her
to sit in the case.
FACTS: Complainant's employment was terminated by the
Colorado Department of Corrections following the escape of
three inmates from the prison where he worked. Following an
investigation, the warden terminated complainant's employment
for failing to comply with certain administrative regulations,
including writing and submitting two false incident reports, for
violating the staff code of conduct, and for intentionally assisting
the inmates in escaping from the prison. Complainant appealed
and the AU upheld the termination. The ALJ then filed the
record with the board. After the board denied several of
complainant's motions, he filed a motion for disqualification of
one of the members of the board, which the board also denied.
The board member whom complainant sought to disqualify sat as
a decision maker in complainant's case while serving as
adversary counsel to complainant's counsel in another matter.
Disqualification of this board member was the issue on appeal.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that, under these
circumstances, the board member's impartiality as a member of
the tribunal could reasonably be called into question by the
adversarial nature of her role as special assistant attorney general
in a case in which complainant's counsel was her direct
opponent.
Legal Summaries17 11 flfl"
558 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-2
HOLDING: The court of appeal vacated the order of the AU
and remanded it to the board for further proceedings, without
participation by the board member named in complainant's
appeal.
IMPACT: This case sets a stringent standard for ensuring there
is no appearance of impropriety in administrative hearings. Since
a board member is treated like a judge, the same high standard
applies to both. Even if there is no actual bias or conflict of
interest by the board member, if her impartiality could reasonably
be called into question, there is an appearance of impropriety
which demands her disqualification.
MASSACHUSETTS STATE COURT
Covell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.. 791 N.E.2d 877 (Mass. 2003).
LAW: Evidence gleaned from hearsay sources can be enough to
satisfy the substantial evidence test so long as that hearsay has an
"indicia of reliability" and there is a sound basis for the decision
made by the hearing officer.
FACTS: A school guidance counselor filed a report pursuant to
the Massachusetts Administrative Code notifying the Department
of Social Services of an allegation that Wayne Covell had
sexually abused his teenaged stepdaughter, Linda. Following its
investigation, the department decided that the allegation of abuse
was supported and that Covell's name should be listed in the
department's registry of alleged perpetrators. The matter was
also referred to the office of the district attorney in accordance
with the statute, and the district attorney brought a complaint
against Covell alleging three counts of indecent assault and
battery on a child. The department's decision to keep his name
on the list was affirmed by a hearing officer and again by the
superior court, and Covell appealed. While that appeal was
pending, Covell was acquitted of the criminal charges. The
appeals court was notified of his acquittal and deferred action on
his appeal pending his application to reopen administrative
proceedings and submit additional evidence gleaned at trial.
Covell was granted a new hearing before a different hearing
officer. At this hearing, Covell testified, but Linda did not.
Legal Summaries
However, Covell introduced most of the transcript from the
criminal trial at which Linda, her mother and Covell had all
testified. The hearing officer determined that there was
reasonable cause to keep his name on the list, affirming the
department's decision. Covell appealed, claiming that the
hearing officer's decision was not supported by substantial
evidence and that he is therefore entitled to reversal of the
department's decision.
ANALYSIS: The court engaged in a detailed synopsis of the
procedure by which a person's name is placed in the central
registry and a component of that registry containing a list of
alleged perpetrators. A decision to "support" an allegation does
not mean that the department has made any finding with regard to
the perpetrator of the reported incident of abuse or neglect. It
simply means that there is reasonable cause to believe that some
caretaker did inflict abuse or neglect upon the child in question.
When the investigation does identify a specific alleged
perpetrator of a supported incident of abuse, there must be
substantial evidence indicating that the alleged perpetrator was
responsible for the abuse or neglect. The court explained that
once the department has properly decided to support the report of
abuse based on the "reasonable cause" standard, the listing of the
alleged perpetrator is merely a matter of identification that does
not impose a higher standard of proof on the underlying
determination that the abuse occurred. To determine whether
there was substantial evidence of the underlying abuse, there
must be a complete transcript of the hearing. Covell only
submitted part of the record, giving rise to the department's
defense that Covell's substantial evidence argument should not
be entertained in the absence of the entire hearing transcript. The
court is convinced by this argument, but continues its analysis as
if there was a complete transcript. The court determined that the
detail and consistent nature of Linda's reports, her resistance to
the suggestiveness of leading questions, and the absence of any
motive or reason for her to make false allegations against Covell
combined satisfy the substantial evidence test. Regardless of
whether those statements were presented through hearsay
sources, the test was met because that hearsay had an "indicia of
reliability."
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HOLDING: The court found that there was substantial evidence
to support the hearing officer's decision to keep Covell's name in
the central registry.
IMPACT: This decision gives great discretion to the hearing
officer in determining what evidence can provide the basis for his
or her decision. Since the substantial evidence test is such a low
burden of proof, a hearing officer is only required to have a
"sound basis" for his or her decision, which effectively grants
wide latitude in decision-making.
